


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**UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY**

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

April 30, 1984


**MEMORANDUM FOR:**

Robert M. Kimmitt,  
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

Charles Hill,  
Executive Secretary, Department of State


Colonel John H. Stanford,  
Executive Secretary, Department of Defense

STAT

  
Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency

**SUBJECT: Asilomar Conference Speech**

A draft copy of the Director's speech to be given on May 5, 1984, before the Asilomar Conference in Monterey, California, is attached. Any comments you may have on this speech should be phoned to me (632-4767) not later than Monday, April 30, 1984. This speech draws on the previously distributed Bilderberg speech and other cleared materials.

  
William B. Staples  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
As stated



L-2666

## FORGING IDEAS FOR EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL

IT IS A PLEASURE TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS THE 38TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASILOMAR CONFERENCE.

A STANDARD SAYING IN WASHINGTON GOES SOMETHING LIKE THIS: "NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIETS IS NOT REALLY ALL THAT BAD COMPARED TO THE ORDEAL OF NEGOTIATING OR, TO BE MORE ACCURATE, BATTLING, WITHIN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO GET A POSITION IN THE FIRST PLACE." THAT IS UTTERED ONLY HALF IN JEST, MAJOR -- AND SOMETIMES QUITE BITTER -- DIFFERENCES HAVE CERTAINLY BEEN COMMON, IF NOT THE RULE OF THE DAY, IN NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. NARROWING AND RESOLVING THOSE DIFFERENCES ARE THE PURPOSE AND DIFFICULT TASK OF NEGOTIATION.

BUT, IN TRUTH, THE DISAGREEMENTS THAT TAKE PLACE OVER THE BARGAINING TABLE IN GENEVA CAN PALE COMPARED TO SOME OF THE DEBATES OVER ARMS CONTROL PURPOSES AND POLICIES THAT TAKE PLACE IN WASHINGTON. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, THE CONGRESS, THE PRESS, THE BUREAUCRACY AND THE PUBLIC ALL PARTAKE TO VARYING DEGREES, DEPENDING ON THE ISSUE. ONE CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPANT NOT LONG AGO SUGGESTED THAT "THE KEY QUESTION IN STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL TODAY IS WHETHER WE CAN GET BEYOND NEGOTIATING AMONG OURSELVES SO THAT WE CAN BEGIN TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIET UNION".

-2-

FREE AND OPEN EXCHANGES ARE PART OF WHAT MAKES US A GREAT NATION. SOME DIVERGENCY OF VIEWPOINTS ON ARMS CONTROL WILL NO DOUBT ALWAYS PERSIST. BUT WE NEED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS A SUBJECT WHERE A LARGE DEGREE OF CONSENSUS IS VITALLY NECESSARY IF WE ARE TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING. WE SIMPLY CANNOT AFFORD TO BE DIVIDED OVER THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF OUR APPROACH.

SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL IS A LONG-TERM ENDEAVOR AND OUR PRINCIPAL NEGOTIATING PARTNER -- THE SOVIET UNION -- TAKES A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. MOSCOW DOES NOT NECESSARILY SHARE OUR IMPATIENCE WITH REGARD TO RESOLVING THE PRESSING PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL. IF THE SOVIETS PERCEIVE THAT WE ARE DIVIDED, THEY WILL ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT THOSE DIVISIONS. IF THE SOVIETS CALCULATE THAT LATER PROPOSALS MAY BE PUT FORWARD WHICH ARE MORE FAVORABLE TO THEM, THEY ARE FULLY PREPARED TO WAIT.

HAVING A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF HOW OUR SYSTEM WORKS, THE SOVIETS FREQUENTLY ASSUME THAT IF THEY SIT BACK AND HANG TOUGH, THEY CAN COUNT ON US TO NEGOTIATE WITH OURSELVES AND COME UP WITH NEW PROPOSALS TO TRY TO MOVE THEM. IT IS AN AGE-OLD STRATEGY. UNFORTUNATELY, EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THE SOVIETS THAT IT IS A SAFE AND SOMETIMES WISE STRATEGY FOR THEM TO PURSUE.

-3-

THIS UNDERLINES THE NEED FOR SOME CONSTANCY AND CONSENSUS, OR AT LEAST SUFFICIENT SUPPORT, IF OUR ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS ARE TO BE SUCCESSFUL. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS PUT GREAT EFFORT INTO BUILDING BIPARTISAN SUPPORT AT HOME AND GREATER COMMONALITY AND CONSULTATION WITH OUR ALLIES. THIS ALSO UNDERLINES THE NEED TO TRY TO LOOK AHEAD, FARTHER DOWN THE ROAD, TO SEE HOW WE CAN STRENGTHEN OUR BASIC ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES AND THE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THEM.

THE US ARMS CONTROL AGENDA UNDER PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS BEEN, AND CONTINUES TO BE, AN EXTENSIVE ONE.

- O BEFORE THE SOVIETS WALKED OUT OF THE INF TALKS, WE INTRODUCED FOUR INITIATIVES, WORKING CLOSELY WITH OUR ALLIES, TO TRY TO OVERCOME THE IMPASSE. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, PERSISTED IN THEIR HALF-ZERO OPTION: THAT IS, ZERO LAND-BASED INF SYSTEMS FOR NATO AND HUNDREDS FOR THE SOVIET UNION.
- O WE HAVE SEVERAL MAJOR PROPOSALS AND APPROACHES ON THE TABLE IN START, ALL AIMED AT ACHIEVING DEEP REDUCTIONS IN THE MOST DESTABILIZING STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. THE SOVIETS HAVE INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED THOSE TALKS BUT ARE LIKELY TO RETURN, IF NOT LATER THIS YEAR THEN

-4-

NEXT. WE ARE NOW ACTIVELY REVIEWING POSITIONS TO INSURE THAT WHEN THE SOVIETS DO COME BACK, WE WILL BE READY AND FLEXIBLE.

- O MULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE WHERE MUCH OF THE ACTION IS THIS YEAR -- IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT WE ARE FOCUSING ON A TOTAL GLOBAL BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS RECENTLY PROPOSED BY THE US; IN MBFR WE LOOK FORWARD TO SHOWING SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THE DATA QUESTION IF THE EAST IS READY TO BE FLEXIBLE ON VERIFICATION ISSUES; AND IN THE CDE WE WILL TRY TO GET DOWN TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS, BUT SOVIET WILLINGNESS REMAINS A QUESTION MARK.

RATHER THAN DISCUSS SPECIFIC ISSUES IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, I WOULD LIKE TODAY TO FOCUS ON TWO LONGER-TERM APPROACHES -- SOMEWHAT "NEW TRACKS", IF YOU WILL -- TOWARD ACHIEVING OUR ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES. THE FIRST IS THE NEED TO SEEK WAYS BY WHICH WE CAN, OVER TIME, REDUCE THE ROLE AND PERCEIVED IMPORTANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN OUR DEFENSE POSTURE. THE SECOND IS THE DESIRABILITY OF GIVING FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO HOW WE MIGHT ADVANCE ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES THROUGH LESS FORMAL AND PROBABLY LESS COMPREHENSIVE ARRANGEMENTS. BOTH OF THESE TRACKS HAVE POTENTIAL PROMISE IF WE ARE WILLING AND ABLE TO PURSUE THEM.

-5-

DE-EMPHASIZING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

A GREAT CONCERN AMONG WESTERN PUBLICS FOCUSES ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THAT IS ENTIRELY UNDERSTANDABLE. NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE TRULY TERRIFYING INSTRUMENTS CAPABLE OF WREAKING UNPARALLELED DESTRUCTION. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE WORLD TODAY ADD UP TO 5,000 TIMES ALL THE FIREPOWER THAT WAS USED BY ALL SIDES DURING WORLD WAR II.

NO DOUBT, WE NEED TO EXPLAIN BETTER THE ROLE THESE WEAPONS OCCUPY IN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND, IMPORTANTLY, OUR EFFORTS TO REDUCE THEM.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE WILL, FOR AS FAR AS WE CAN SEE INTO THE FUTURE, BE A CENTRAL ELEMENT IN US SECURITY POLICY. THE US COMMITMENT OF THAT DETERRENT FOR THE PROTECTION OF US ALLIES IS AT THE HEART OF NATO. WHATEVER ELSE WE DO, WE MUST NOT CAST DOUBT ON THE VIABILITY OF THAT DETERRENT STRATEGY, AS DOUBT ONLY INCREASES INSTABILITY AND THE CHANCES OF MISCALCULATION.

BUT A NUMBER OF FACTORS ARGUE FOR BEGINNING TO EXAMINE SOME POSSIBLE STEPS TOWARD REDUCING THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE RELY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN US AND WESTERN SECURITY STRATEGY. FOR ONE, THE US NO LONGER HAS THE CLEAR NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY THAT IT ENJOYED UP UNTIL THE LATE 1960'S. FOR ANOTHER, THE PROSPECT THAT NUCLEAR WAR COULD HAVE

-6-

DRASTIC, LONG-TERM, GLOBAL EFFECTS IS BEING DRIVEN HOME MORE AND MORE BY SOME RECENT RESEARCH. THE IDEA OF A "NUCLEAR WINTER" -- WHICH KNOWS NO BOUNDARIES BETWEEN ATTACKER AND THE ATTACKED OR BETWEEN COMBATANTS AND INNOCENT PEOPLES -- MAY BE WELL-FOUNDED.

FINALLY, BUT BY NO MEANS LAST, THERE IS GREAT AND UNDERSTANDABLE CONCERN AMONG WESTERN PUBLICS OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT I HAVE NOTED. PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN OUR DETERRENT STRATEGY WILL BE UNDERMINED IF WE ARE PERCEIVED AS RELYING TOO HEAVILY ON THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR ANNIHILATION.

IT IS BOTH REASONABLE AND POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE DECISION-MAKERS WITH CAPABILITIES THAT WILL PRESENT OPTIONS OTHER THAN THE HOBSON CHOICE OF EARLY INITIATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE WITH THE DANGER OF ANNIHILATION OR INACTION WITH THE DANGER OF SURRENDER AND LOSS OF FREEDOM. NEW CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGIES OFFER ONE WAY TO REDUCE OUR RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL CAN ALSO HELP,

SIGNIFICANT OPPORTUNITIES ARE OPENING UP IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS THAT COULD PROVIDE WAYS OF DE-EMPHASIZING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOTH THE STRATEGIC AND THEATER LEVELS. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS THAT COULD EFFECTIVELY ASSUME MILITARY ROLES THAT UP UNTIL NOW HAVE BEEN



-7-

ACHIEVABLE ONLY BY NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE ON THE HORIZON. THESE SYSTEMS ARE BASED ON TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVED WAYS OF FINDING AND DISTINGUISHING TARGETS ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND IN THE REAR; ON MORE SOPHISTICATED COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS; AND ON MORE EFFECTIVE CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS -- THE SO-CALLED SMART WEAPONS.

OUR ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS ARE DESIGNED TO AFFECT SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN FORCES. START AND INF WOULD DIRECTLY REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ALL OUR PROPOSALS IN THESE TALKS ARE CONSISTENT WITH OUR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGY. NEVERTHELESS, THEY REFLECT A WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE THE EMPHASIS THAT HAS BEEN PLACED TO DATE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

IN ADDITION, THE WEST HAS TAKEN SEVERAL UNILATERAL STEPS TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE US NUCLEAR STOCKPILE TODAY IS A THIRD BELOW ITS 1967 PEAK, YET STILL MORE EFFECTIVE. ALLIANCE DECISIONS OVER THE LAST FOUR YEARS WILL RESULT IN A NET DECREASE OF 2,400 WEAPONS IN THE NUCLEAR STOCKPILE IN EUROPE.

THESE ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS, COMBINED WITH IMPROVEMENTS IN OUR CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES CAN SET THE STAGE FOR A SECURITY POLICY THAT PLACES LESS EMPHASIS ON THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SOME OF THESE CONVENTIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

-8-

AND PROGRAMS ARE, ADMITTEDLY, STILL IN THE EARLY STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT. BUT WE NEED TO LOOK AT THEM NOW IN TERMS OF HOW THEY CAN ENHANCE OUR DETERRENT POSTURE AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN IT.

A LOOK AT THE LATE 1950'S AND, PARTICULARLY, THE 1960'S SHOWS US THAT EFFORTS TO SIGNIFICANTLY STRENGTHEN CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES HAVE RUN UP AGAINST TWO MAJOR CONCERNS. THE FIRST RELATES TO THE EFFECT GENERALLY ON THE US NUCLEAR COMMITMENT TO NATO; THE SECOND RELATES TO COST.

PAST EFFORTS BY THE US TO STRENGTHEN CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES -- AND THEREBY TO DE-EMPHASIZE NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- RUN THE RISK OF SEEMING TO EUROPEANS AS A WEAKENING OF THE BASIC AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO ITS ALLIES. IT SEEMS TO ME, HOWEVER, THAT STRENGTHENED CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES WOULD ACTUALLY ENHANCE THAT COMMITMENT BY SUPPLEMENTING, NOT REPLACING, THE NUCLEAR COMPONENT.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES ARE, GENERALLY SPEAKING, MORE EXPENSIVE THAN NUCLEAR DEFENSE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE REAL COST OF SIGNIFICANTLY STRENGTHENED CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE HOTLY DISPUTED -- AS ARE MANY OTHER DEFENSE COST ISSUES.

-9-

THIS DOES NOT ARGUE FOR A CHANGE IN NATO'S STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. THAT DOCTRINE, CAREFULLY CRAFTED IN THE 1960'S, HAS SERVED THE ALLIANCE WELL AND REMAINS VALID TODAY.

MOREOVER, A CONVENTIONAL BUILD-UP SHOULD CLEARLY NOT BE ENTERTAINED AS A WAY TO MAKE POSSIBLE A POLICY OF "NO FIRST-USE" OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. EVEN IF SUCH A MAJOR BUILD-UP WERE ATTAINABLE, WHICH IS HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE, THAT POLICY WOULD BE BOTH UNWISE AND DANGEROUS. TO QUALIFY THE US COMMITMENT TO ITS OWN DEFENSE OR TO THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE WITH A "NO FIRST-USE" POSTURE WOULD LOWER THE SOVIET CALCULATION OF THE RISKS AND POTENTIAL COSTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST NATO. THAT WOULD NOT SERVE OUR FUNDAMENTAL POLICY OBJECTIVE OF DETERRENCE.

BUT FLEXIBLE RESPONSE -- SUPPLEMENTED BY AN INTEGRATED POLICY FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCE DEVELOPMENT THAT WOULD OFFER A CHOICE OF "NO EARLY FIRST-USE" -- WOULD PRESERVE AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT AND GO A LONG WAY TO REASSURING OUR PUBLICS. AND, AS PROFESSOR MICHAEL HOWARD HAS NOTED, "REASSURANCE" OF WESTERN PUBLICS AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES HAS BEEN AS IMPORTANT IN MAINTAINING OUR FREEDOM AND SECURITY AS HAS "DETERRENCE" IN ITS NARROWER SENSE.

-10-

DE FACTO AND DE JURE ARMS CONTROL

GENERALLY SPEAKING, SOME ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS MIGHT TAKE A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT SHAPE IN YEARS TO COME. TO DATE THEY HAVE BEEN LARGELY IN THE FORM OF FORMAL AGREEMENTS AS THE MEANS OF IMPOSING LIMITS. THESE, OF COURSE, ESTABLISH MUTUAL AND SPECIFIC LEGAL OBLIGATIONS BINDING ON THE PARTIES. WE SHOULD, WHERE POSSIBLE, CONTINUE TO SEEK SUCH LEGALLY BINDING ARRANGEMENTS TO REDUCE AND OTHERWISE LIMIT ARMS.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD BE ALERT TO POSSIBILITIES FOR ENGAGING IN ARMS CONTROL BY MUTUAL RESTRAINT, MUTUAL EXAMPLE, OR MUTUAL AGREED NATIONAL UNDERTAKINGS. THIS COULD BE COMPRISED, FOR EXAMPLE, OF STATEMENTS OF NATIONAL POLICY -- UNILATERAL UNDERTAKINGS BY THE SIDES -- WHICH COULD BE NEGOTIATED AND CONFIRMED IN EXCHANGES OF DECLARATIONS OR LETTERS. THE OUTCOME WOULD BE DE FACTO ARRANGEMENT WHICH, IN SOME INSTANCES, COULD BE BOTH EASIER TO ACHIEVE AND SIMPLER TO CARRY OUT.

THESE KIND OF ARRANGEMENTS WOULD NOT, OBVIOUSLY, APPLY TO ALL SITUATIONS. IN WEIGHING THE RELATIVE MERITS OF A DE JURE OR DE FACTO ARRANGEMENT IN ANY GIVEN CASE, CERTAIN CONSIDERATIONS COME TO MIND.

-11-

COMPREHENSIVENESS IS ONE OF THEM. THIS IS BOTH A VIRTUE AND A PROBLEM. IT IS A VIRTUE IN THE SENSE THAT IT IS BEST TO LIMIT ALL CRITICAL CATEGORIES OF ARMS AND FORCES. OTHERWISE, SYSTEMS THAT ARE NOT LIMITED HAVE A TENDENCY TO BE BUILT UP AND EXPLOITED. THIS CAN, EFFECT, UNDERCUT THE CONSTRAINTS ON SYSTEMS LIMITED. IT IS A LOT LIKE A BALLOON THAT IS SQUEEZED IN ONE AREA ONLY TO BULGE OUT IN AREAS THAT ARE NOT SO CONSTRAINED.

THE FIRST STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, FROZE THE NUMBER OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE AND SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS, BUT PLACED NO REAL LIMITATIONS ON THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS OR ON THROWWEIGHT -- IMPORTANT MEASURES OF THE OVERALL DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY OF MISSILES. WE WITNESSED, DURING THE 1970'S, SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON THESE MISSILES WITH THE US NUMBER DOUBLING AND THE SOVIET NUMBER MORE THAN TRIPLING. WE SAW, PARTICULARLY, A TREMENDOUS INCREASE IN THE THROW-WEIGHT CAPABILITY OF THE SOVIET MISSILE FORCES, AND IT IS NOW NEARLY TWO-AND-A-HALF TIMES THE US FORCES IN THIS REGARD.

WHILE A MORE COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT IS MORE LIKELY TO LIMIT REAL MILITARY CAPABILITY, THEY ARE BY DEFINITION MORE COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE. THEY ARE ALSO,

-12-

IN MANY RESPECTS, MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO VERIFY. IN FACT, ACHIEVING COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENTS IN SOME AREAS ARE TODAY, JUST AS THEY HAVE BEEN THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY OF ARMS CONTROL, VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE VERIFICATION DIFFICULTIES. HENCE, WE ESTABLISH PRIORITIES AND SEEK TO BE AS COMPREHENSIVE AS POSSIBLE.

DE FACTO ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE A TENDENCY TO BE LESS COMPREHENSIVE, AND TO FOCUS ON AREAS OR SYSTEMS WHERE VERIFICATION PRESENTS FEWER RATHER THAN MORE PROBLEMS. THEY WOULD, IN THEORY, BE EASIER TO NEGOTIATE AND POSSIBLY QUICKER. BY BEING LESS FORMAL, DE FACTO ARRANGEMENTS WOULD ALSO BE MORE EASILY MODIFIED IF CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGED THAN WOULD LEGALLY-BINDING TREATIES OR AGREEMENTS. THAT, AS WELL, CAN CUT BOTH WAYS DEPENDING ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES. IN GOING DOWN A MORE LIMITED PATH IN ANY GIVEN AREA, HOWEVER, WE WOULD NEED TO CONSIDER THE IMPACT OR EFFECT ON OUR BROADER OBJECTIVES.

IN THE UNITED STATES, LAW REQUIRES THAT ANY OBLIGATION UNDERTAKEN WHICH LIMITS OUR ARMED FORCES OR ARMS MUST BE APPROVED BY THE SENATE AS A TREATY OR AUTHORIZED BY SPECIAL ENABLING LEGISLATION PASSED BY BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS. THE SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT WAS APPROVED IN THE LATTER MANNER. ALTERNATIVELY, RESTRAINT AS A NATIONAL

-13-

POLICY -- SUCH AS OUR POLICY ON NOT UNDERCUTTING SALT I OR SALT II AS LONG AS THE SOVIETS EXERCISE SIMILAR RESTRAINT -- WOULD NOT NECESSARILY REQUIRE THAT KIND OF APPROVAL. NEVERTHELESS, WORKING CLOSELY WITH CONGRESS WILL ALWAYS BE NECESSARY TO AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF TRYING TO "END-RUN THE SYSTEM", WHICH WOULD BE FOOLISH.

I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT WE SHOULD TURN OUR ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE LONG AND ARDUOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS TO MORE SIMPLE APPROACHES OUTSIDE OF AGREEMENTS. THAT WOULD NOT SERVE OUR INTERESTS OR LIKELY BE SUCCESSFUL.

BUT I AM SUGGESTING THAT, AS WE LOOK DOWN THE ROAD AT ARMS CONTROL, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO ADVANCE OUR OBJECTIVES IN CERTAIN AREAS BY ESTABLISHING MUTUAL RESTRAINT THROUGH DE FACTO, RECIPROCAL UNDERTAKINGS. GIVEN THE OBVIOUS PROBLEMS OF NEGOTIATING AND THEN ACHIEVING APPROVAL FOR FULL-FLEDGED ARMS CONTROL ACCORDS, WE SHOULD NOT IGNORE THOSE POSSIBILITIES.

NOR AM I SUGGESTING THAT THIS RESTRAINT SHOULD BE UNILATERAL. UNILATERAL EXAMPLES CAN BE IMPORTANT. WE SHOULD, I THINK WE WILL ALL AGREE, TRY TO LEAD THE WAY TOWARD MORE STABILIZING AND SURVIVABLE SYSTEMS. THE

- 14 -

PRESIDENT'S EFFORT FOR THE SMALL MISSILE, THE SO-CALLED MIDGETMAN, IS JUST SUCH A PROGRAM. MOVING TOWARD MORE STABILIZING SYSTEMS IS CRITICAL TO REDUCING THE RISKS OF WAR.

BUT UNILATERAL ACTION DOES NOT USUALLY GET US VERY FAR AND IS NOT SUFFICIENT. WHILE THE WEST EXERCISED RESTRAINT IN DEVELOPING STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES IN THE 1970'S, WE WITNESSED A MASSIVE AND UNSURPASSED SOVIET BUILDUP. SO, I AM FOCUSING ON RECIPROCAL, NOT UNILATERAL, UNDERTAKINGS.

ARMS CONTROL IS INEVITABLY A MAJOR INGREDIENT IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS. WHETHER THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AND RETURN TO THE NUCLEAR ARMS TALKS IS THE THE BIG QUESTION MARK. WE, OF COURSE, HOPE THAT THEY CAN GET DOWN TO BUSINESS IN ALL THE ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS.

IF THEY DO, AND IF WE PERSIST IN SOUND POSITIONS, WE CAN LOOK FORWARD TO FIRST, DEEP REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WARHEADS; SECOND, INCENTIVES FOR MORE STABILIZING SYSTEMS AND PENALTIES FOR THOSE THAT HAVE GREATER FIRST STRIKE POTENTIAL; AND THIRD, GREATER PREDICTABILITY IN MILITARY PLANNING. WE SHOULD ALSO HOPE FOR A BETTER SOVIET RECORD ON COMPLIANCE ISSUES.



WE SHOULD NOT THINK, HOWEVER, THAT SUCCESS IN ARMS CONTROL WILL MODERATE SOVIET BEHAVIOR AROUND THE WORLD. WITHIN A FEW MONTHS OF THE JUNE 1973 NIXON-BREZHNEV SUMMIT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIET CONSPICUOUSLY FAILED TO NOTIFY THE UNITED STATES OF THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR THEY KNEW WAS IMMINENT AND THEN PROVOCATIVELY WIDENED RISKS OF THAT WAR. THE SOVIETS THREATENED TO INTERVENE UNILATERALLY, A MOVE WHICH PROMPTED THE US TO GO ON HIGHER STRATEGIC ALERT. THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN IN DECEMBER 1979 WAS LAUNCHED ONLY A FEW MONTHS AFTER THE CARTER-BREZHNEV SUMMIT IN VIENNA SIGNING SALT II. WE SHOULD, IN THIS LIGHT, NOT LOAD ARMS CONTROL UP WITH POTENTIAL BENEFITS THAT IT CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO DELIVER.

BARBARA TUCHMAN ONCE OBSERVED THAT "A PROBLEM THAT STRIKES ONE IN THE STUDY OF HISTORY, REGARDLESS OF PERIOD, IS WHY MAN MAKES A POORER PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENT THAN OF ALMOST ANY OTHER HUMAN ACTIVITY".

BUT, IN THE ADVANCED NUCLEAR AGE, WE CANNOT AFFORD POOR PERFORMANCE IN OUR SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL STRATEGIES. NOR CAN WE AFFORD NOT TO TRY TO LOOK DOWN THE ROAD TO POSSIBLE NEW, OR AT LEAST DIFFERENT, HORIZONS. I HAVE TRIED TO OUTLINE A COUPLE OF THOSE TODAY. MORE OBVIOUSLY EXIST AND WILL WARRANT OUR ATTENTION.